Freud’s On Narcissism

Introduction

The narcissist cannot be helped, at least according to Freud and other early psychoanalysts. Narcissists are doomed as they cannot connect with the psychoanalyst for the method to work. This is worrisome since, as some cultural critics have argued, in recent decades society has become increasingly marked by narcissism. If talk therapy cannot provide aid, must narcissists by abandoned to their own lights?

This “love directed towards the image of oneself,” as popular culture would have it, gradually entered the vernacular through Freud’s more technical On Narcissism: An Introduction at the turn of the 20th century, which attempted “to justify the introduction of the concept of narcissism.” This article has given rise to numerous interpretations. Rather than attempting to defend the most plausible view amongst the commentators, I will here highlight that Freud’s pessimistic prognosis is dubious since it follows from his insistence upon transference, which rests on a metaphysical assumption that is far from certain.

Freud’s Account of Narcissism

To make sense of Freud’s account of narcissism requires bringing the psychic apparatus into view. For Freud, the psyche is composed of three major parts, each with distinct functions: the id, ego, and superego. The function of the id is the preservation of the ego, which results in sexual drives to reproduce, as well as other bodily pleasures and pains that preserve the life of this ego. In contrast, there is the superego, or what he refers to as the “conscience.” Its function is to repress specific desires of the id, but also drives foreign to the “common ideal of a family, class, or nation,” or some ego ideal, which is a key element within the superego. Hence, the function of the superego is ethical, as it orients towards an ego ideal, and moral, as it makes demands that repress other drives. The actual ego, the third part of the psychic apparatus, is what arbitrates between the desires of the id and the commands of the superego. The actual ego is measured against the ego ideal, which determines one’s self-regard. As Freud writes, the superego “constantly watches the actual ego and measures it by that ideal.” These are then the major components of Freud’s mature account of the psychic apparatus.

Now, at its most basic level, narcissism is identified based on where drives are invested. Freud reasons that when drives, or libidinal energies, are cathected to some object – read other – the actual ego is in a state of normalcy because the function of the id is fulfilled. Dysfunction arises, and thereby psychopathology, when libidinal energy is introjected into the ego, in particular the ego ideal of the superego. As he writes, “the libido that has been withdrawn from the external world has been directed to the ego [read self] and this gives rise to an attitude which may be described as narcissism.” This pathological state goes hand in hand with psychosis, which is a technical term that signifies having become detached from external reality. Psychosis is distinct from neurosis, which is another technical term that signifies the inevitable tension experienced by the actual ego from conflicting drives and demands. Neurosis is inevitable and can at most be alleviated; psychosis, on the other hand, is pathological and may or may not be cured, depending on who you ask.

To further demarcate psychotic pathological narcissism, Freud distinguishes it from primary narcissism, which is part of normal development and “there from the very first.” All children pass through a stage of primary narcissism where there is “an original libidinal cathexis of the ego.” However, humans can always regress back into this primary stage later, albeit the second time round constitutes pathological narcissism since the id ceases to function when libidinal energies are directed away from others and onto the ego ideal. The causes of someone regressing into pathological narcissism are varied, although Freud suggests that “injury sustained to the ego through sexual trends” likely contributes. Whatever the case may be, I will bracket that here and assume that the state of an inward cathexis to the ego ideal is a possible state of the psyche.

Freud’s Prognosis and Metaphysical Assumption

With a sketch of the type, Freud writes that patients who have diverted their interest from the external world “become inaccessible to the influence of psychoanalysis and cannot be cured by our effort.” Or, “it seemed as though this kind of narcissistic attitude in them constituted one of the limits of their susceptibility of influence.” The method to cure a patient for the psychoanalyst who wants to put in the effort is transference. Transference is when the reality-detached psychotic transfers whatever unconscious complex that causes their loss of reality to the more reality-anchored psychoanalyst, who can, by helping process their complex, ideally instill into the psychotic a modified reality principle thereby returning them to social reality. However, since narcissists have so introjected their libidinal energies, a relationship with the psychoanalyst cannot be established; the therapeutic alliance, which is a necessary condition of any successful psychotherapy, is impossible. It follows that transference cannot occur. Hence, Freud’s pessimistic prognosis that narcissists cannot be cured.

While transference may take the limelight in Freud’s pessimistic prognosis, there is an assumption operative in Freud’s drawing this conclusion. The major assumption that makes Freud’s account of narcissism work, and why transference is the method in psychoanalytic practice generally, is that reality is external. Throughout ON, we find multiple references to “reality” without an explanation as to what reality is. The scientifically-minded empiricist Freud takes it for granted that reality is materialistic and external. And to reiterate, normalcy is just whenever the individual’s id relates to what Freud assumes to be the more real external objects. And psychosis is when individuals do not relate to external objects, which he assumes to be more real. Thus, he bases his account of psychosis on this assumption and thereby categorizes people who are more idealistically inclined as psychotic, detached from reality, and, to caricature, lost in a fantastical world that does not exist anywhere but in their minds.

While materialists, like Freud, will object that the alternative of idealism is illusory, that since it cannot be empirically verified it is just one fantasy versus another, it is worth highlighting how his materialism also requires leap of faith. Neither it nor idealism can be definitively proven. What’s more, paradoxically, Freud claims to follow an empirical method, to base his conclusions on where the material facts lead, but a good amount of his evidence is a group of patients introspecting and reporting their ideas, which is the method that often follows from the idealist in the armchair. Freud repudiates such speculative projects in his insistence upon an empirical method, which is more compatible with materialism, yet his conclusions are based on subjective speculations, on the various ideas of his patients.

On top of this, Freud’s metaphysics was already under fire within his lifetime by Jung. Jung’s criticism of Freud suggested that the withdrawal of libido inward would produce an “ascetic anchorite” – not necessarily a psychotic narcissist – who may have “diverted his sexual interest from human beings entirely, and yet may have sublimated it into a heightened interest in the divine … without his libido having undergone an introversion on to his phantasies [to some unreality] or a return to his ego.” I take this as saying the libido can still be turned away from external objects without resulting in some state of illusion, without their libido being cathected to fantasies or their ego. To further shore up this internal objection, we can also critique Freud’s account externally via considering Kierkegaard’s analysis of the psyche, which shows how psychotic malfunctioning could be explained, not as a misrelation to external objects, but as a despairing misrelation within some human to their self.

Questioning Freud’s Prognosis

It is possible to further challenge Freud’s metaphysical assumption and prognosis by considering the alternative account found in Kierkegaard’s Sickness Unto Death. In this work, we find Kierkegaard’s account of despair through his mouthpiece Anti-Climacus. Following Ernest Becker in The Denial of Death, Kierkegaard can be considered as a proto-psychoanalyst whose “forms of despair” are similar to Freud’s notion of psychosis.

For Anti-Climacus, the self is fundamentally relational and composed of a synthesis of mind, or “symbolic self,” and body. The psychology within this dualistic anthropology is the hinge element of this alternative idealistic account, namely the existence of a two-tiered self, or the existence of an inner and an outer self. The inner self is what Anti-Climacus refers to as spirit, whereas the outer self is the linguistically mediated, socially conditioned complex – Freud’s ego. For Freud, the self is just mediated socially; Anti-Climacus would disputes this and argue that the two-tiered self has an empirically conditioned element, reason or their symbolic self, and another element that participates in the transcendent Absolute that is also immanent. In Freud’s terms, the actual ego and superego that appears is the outer self, which conceals, Anti-Climacus would argue, some more profound truth, the inner self that is related to the Absolute. For Anti-Climacus, this inner aspect of one’s self is more real, and people fall into states of despair and are sick unto death when they forget this aspect of their being. As Anti-Climacus writes, “to be unaware of being defined as spirit is precisely what despair is.”

Now, Becker illustrates the relation between this despair and psychosis. He reasons that when someone fails to relate properly to the features of the “symbolic self,” which I take as a linguistically mediated mind, that psychoses follow, that someone falls into some state of despair. For example, there can be an excess of infinitude, which constitutes someone becoming “fantastical,” or cut off from physical reality. If we consider the narcissist, who has invested their libidinal energy into their ego ideal, they are clearly gravitating towards this “fantastical” state of despair whether or not they even know it. On the other hand, the excess of finitude, another feature of the symbolic self, also promotes a sense of despair. The same holds when Anti-Climacus considers the marks of possibility and necessity, namely, an excess or lack of either of these qualities constitutes a unique form of despair. In any case, there is either an extreme lack of limit or an extreme excess of limit, which provokes the despair as these extreme options are all misrelations to the self. These states can be rendered as psychoses since these states of relating to oneself diverge from the truth, from the reality, of the human condition reasons Anti-Climacus on Becker’s interpretation. Ultimately, as Becker notes, “all the characters he has so far sketched represent degrees of lying about oneself in relation to the reality of the human condition.”

Unsurprisingly, Anti-Climacus suggests that any of these forms of despair, these lies about what it is to be human, can be overcome if the self learns to relate to itself, or if the self becomes itself and thereby enters into a particular mode of relating. By this, Anti-Climacus means establishing a God relation, where the “fantastical” being is humbled by the actual Absolute, or the finite self comes to witness the true inner self. As Anti-Climacus writes, “the self is the conscious synthesis of infinitude and finitude that relates itself to itself, whose task is to become itself, which can be done only through the relationship to God.” The completion of this task is captured in: “in relating itself to itself and in willing to be itself, the self rests transparently in the power that established it.” For this, the psychotic self must die, as he writes, sickness until death “literally means a sickness of which the end and the result are death,” but “Christianly understood, death itself is a passing into life” as becoming a self by recognizing the immanent true self or the Absolute transforms the psyche. What seems incurable then to the psychoanalyst operating from a materialistic metaphysics, and thereby depending on the method of transference, could be cured if an alternative metaphysical assumption was made and cultivates insight into the inner self.

I imagine many material atheists such as Freud would be eager to object to this alternative metaphysics and view of the self at this point. However, to further support Kierkegaard’s alternative, especially in our secular scientific age which is so quick to dismiss such traditional views as outdated prattle and nonsense, let us consider, even excluding Christianity, how idealistic religious metaphysics, across cultures, throughout the course of history, time and time again, facilitate the generation of compassion and empathy, the shift from the self-centred to the other-centred through the integration of religious ideas. How could such transformations be explained given that an alteration of character requires altered motivations having firmly taken root in an individual’s worldview? It would seem such transformations follow from the individual becoming convinced of a reality, an insight about themselves and others that religious ideas facilitate. It would seem that psychosis can be cured by insights that establish a Divine relation, that unconceal some profound truth about the apparent self. When one takes the alternative idealistic metaphysics seriously, which, to reiterate, is reasonable since these notions are referred to in different terms by nearly all religious cultures, the upshot is that one does not need to establish a transference with a psychoanalyst in order to, as Philip Grief points out in defending the analytic attitude, “to commit the patient to the symbol system of the community,” rather the Divine serves as the therapist, the Ideas replace this material other, and the psychotic patient transfers their malady through the Ideas and, by immediately recognizing the truth of their condition, kills the old psychotic self and establishes a new way of relating. While Freud’s assumption that human beings possess at most a socially conditioned self leads him to conclude that they must sync themselves up to the external reality to be normal; Kierkegaard suggests that there is more to the self than external social conditioning, and humans become normal functioning beings when they are united with this truth about their condition.

In some sense, this earlier account and alternative to Freud was echoed in Jung’s criticism of Freud. Jung insisted on the introduction of religious symbols to assist some psychotic self in returning to a state of normalcy. Jung seems to suggest the solidification of such symbols facilitates a letting go of attachment to conjured illusions about the human condition, which is illustrated in Kierkegaard’s account in SUD. Thus, Jung and Kierkegaard are two figures who would surely take issue with Freud’s supposition about reality and the pessimistic prognosis for narcissists.

Conclusion

To recapitulate, I suggested that Freud’s incurability prognosis of narcissism is too pessimistic and follows from his leap of faith to materialism. Upon juxtaposing Freud to the psychoanalyst Kierkegaard, and seeing the resemblance between such psychosis and despair, we see an alternative method to addressing narcissism and ought not be so pessimistic. In closing, this early 20th century Freudian prognosis of narcissism to this day echoes within the DSM-V. The DSM-V classifies narcissism as a personality disorder and any such disorder as “an enduring pattern,” “pervasive and inflexible,” and “stable over time.” An avenue for future research that remains, which I hypothesis would also mitigate the pessimistic incurability prognoses, is a genealogical analysis of the concept of personality currently operative within psychiatry since assuming the self to be a static personality, rather than a malleable character, underlies the incurability of narcissistic personality disorder.

 

Bibliography

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Crockatt, Philip. “Freud’s ‘On Narcissism: An Introduction,’” in Journal of Child Psychotherapy 32, no. 1 (2006): 4-20.

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Kierkegaard, Søren. The Sickness Unto Death: A Christian Psychological Exposition for Upbuilding and Awakening. Edited and translated by Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1980.

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Sandler, Joseph, Ethel Spector Person, and Peter Fonagy, eds. Freud’s “On Narcissism: An Introduction.” New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1991.

Susman, Warren. “‘Personality’ and the Making of Twentieth-Century Culture.” In Culture as History: The Transformation of American Society in the Twentieth Century, 271-286. New York: Pantheon, 1984.

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