Introduction
Within the Concluding Unscientific Postscript (henceforth CUP), truth is claimed by Climacus, Kierkegaard’s mouthpiece, to be subjective. This work mainly takes issue with Hegel’s account of truth. Rather than attempting to argue for the definitive interpretation of truth by analyzing Hegel and Kierkegaard, what follows is an attempt at questioning the proto-postmodernist, and thereby antirealist interpretation of Climacus’ claim. I will do this by suggesting that the sort of truth Climacus refers to when proclaiming that truth is subjectivity is only moral truth, and highlighting the objective structure of the mode of relating.
To this end, I firstly put Kierkegaard in context by briefly explaining his issue with Hegel’s account of truth. I then consider why some read truth is subjective to be proto-postmodern. From here, I argue that Climacus’ insistence to become subjective does not entail anti-realism, but preserves the real because (1) the truth Climacus refers to is circumscribed to moral truth, not all truth, and this moral truth, which is related to the religious sphere of existence, is real for Kierkegaard; and (2) this truth suggests a specific objective relational structure, in particular (A) the existence of an Absolute mind-independent entity and (B) a passionate appropriation rather than dialectical overcoming.
I: Hegelian Context
Now, Hegel is Climacus’ target. By employing reason in its speculative use, Hegel unfolds his grand system via ever greater sublation (aufhebung). The pinnacle of speculative reason is spirit coming to know itself, which occurs when the subjective spirit becomes identical with the object. At this moment, the subject is said to be in truth. Hegel denies that humans have access to immediate intuition, so the whole must be spelled out systematically in propositions. In other words, Hegel’s core theory of truth maintains that the subject who thinks propositions is said to be in truth when their proposition encapsulates all the necessary insights to fully correspond to the whole object. The culmination of sublating insight upon insight is reaching God’s Mind. The individual’s mind is thereby elevated to God’s level.
Against this, Climacus contends that the identity between thinking and being holds only for God, but not for existing spirits that are in the process of becoming. The speculative trap deceives existing beings into believing a “chimera of abstraction,” namely that they can access the whole. As Climacus writes, “the misfortune of speculative thought is simply that it forgets again and again that the knower is an existing person.” Climacus maintains that human truth is at most only an approximation to the whole. Hence, there is a divide between human knowing and Absolute Knowing that cannot be bridged. Therefore, Climacus stands against Hegelian science as an all-encompassing system that captures the Absolute propositionally and holds more to the Kantian line that limits human reason.
With this very brief overview, Climacus’ following passage is more intelligible:
“When the question of truth is asked objectively, truth is reflected upon objectively as an object to which the knower relates himself. What is reflected upon is not the relation but that what he relates himself to is the truth, the true. If only that to which he relates himself is the truth, the true, then the subject is in the truth.”
The first half of this passage refers to what someone knows or claims to be true. It is the truth that holds for objects, which, against Hegelianism, is, in most cases, going to be the best approximation given one’s conceptual knowledge. Basically, the subject is in truth when their proposition is true, which depends on whether or not the proposition corresponds to the object. The second half, which is more important for our purposes, turns us inwards:
“When the question about truth is asked subjectively, the individual’s relation is reflected upon subjectively. If only the how of this relation is in truth, the individual is in truth, even if he in this way were to relate himself to untruth.”
I take this to mean that the subjective is not about what someone states propositionally, but rather how they relate that determines whether or not the subject is in truth. As he writes, “objectively the emphasis is on what is said; subjectively the emphasis is on how it is said,” which suggests this passage as a whole is a case of knowing-that versus knowing-how. Objective knowledge depends on propositions, whereas subjective knowledge is about the mode in which one relates to objects given and their correlative concepts and propositions.
II: Climacus as proto-postmodern?
However, the idea that the subject can relate to something that is not true, an idol, for instance, yet still be said to be in truth, if the mode of their relation to the idol is in truth, leads some towards reading Climacus here as an anti-realist about truth, that truth does not exist independently of the mind. The truth-value of propositions is irrelevant, what counts is how someone relates. Since anti-realism towards truth seems to be a defining feature of postmodern discourse, some see Climacus as a proto-postmodernist. The main reason some would incline, given my approximations, towards reading Climacus’ claim as nearing subjectivism, where truth is fully dependent on the mind, is denying any specific object as necessary for truth. We see this in the following: “The one prays in truth to God although he is worshipping an idol; the other prays in untruth to the true God and is therefore in truth worshipping an idol.” The passage seems to suggests that I could pray towards some idol and if I do so fervently, “with all the passion of infinity,” I am in truth regardless of the prayer object. Prayer is not holding the truth in mind, but the way I will. But taking truth is subjective in this proto-postmodern direction requires forgetting the distinction between objective and subjective truth within the passage. The disjunction between objective and subjective should rule out associating Climacus with the postmodern critique of mind-independent truth – he does not doubt objective truth exists; this is not subjectivism. The often-overlooked footnote of this passage even highlights how the passage only refers to the essential truth that relates to existing subjects. And secondly, by stating the existence of “the true God,” Climacus implicitly endorses the distinction between the objective and the subjective as the true God suggests there is a correct account of God. Seeing why some take Climacus’ claim on truth to predate postmodern accounts, I now provide more rationale against this to propose preserving the real.
III: Reasons for Preserving the Real
The first reason for reading truth is subjectivity as aligned with traditional realism is that the truth Climacus refers to is just moral truth, not all truth. The subjective truth places emphasis on the how, just like the ethical-religious, as he writes “ethically-religiously, the emphasis is again on: how” which “is to be understand as the relation of the existing person, in his very existence, to what is said.” Thus, the subjective truth is only about moral truth. However, some may thus construe these views to mean he is a moral anti-realist. This is questionable when the spheres of existence within Kierkegaard’s corpus are considered, which incline toward moral realism.
The stages on life’s way, the qualitatively distinct spheres of existence – aesthetic, ethical, and religious – help illustrate the moral realism within Kierkegaard’s corpus. For more context, the ethical life is often taken as a representation of Hegelian Sittlichkeit, the customs and laws of one’s land. The religious, in contrast, stands above the universals within ethical life and refers to the Absolute. The individual within the religious sphere of existence recognizes a higher duty over one’s communal duties. This follows from Fear and Trembling, where the pseudonymous Johannes’ suggests that Abraham, and thereby the Judeo-Christian tradition, is saved only through the teleological suspension of the ethical. And in considering that in Either-or, the pseudonymous Judge Wilhelm, urges the young aesthete about the superiority of the ethical over the life of pleasure too, we can make sense of Westphal’s note that Kierkegaard appropriates Hegel’s method of sublation (aufhebung) in his moral philosophy: the aesthetic is sublated by the ethical, which is in turn sublated by the religious. I make reference to these other works to suggest that we interpret Climacus’ claim in CUP about truth in a more gestalt manner, i.e., by interpreting CUP in light of the corpus that highlights how Kierkegaard is not at really flirting with moral anti-realism, but is committed to moral realism. Hence, truth is subjective is only about moral truth, which Kierkegaard takes as real.
The next reason I offer that casts doubt on the proto-postmodernist classification requires considering the relationship in the religious sphere of existence. The “mode of relating” mentioned above entails a particular relational structure. I want to stress two elements of this structure to suggest that this mode is mind-independently real, namely (1) the existence of an Absolute entity and (2) the need for passionate appropriation to relate to this entity and become subjective.
The first necessary condition of this mode of relating follows from Climacus’ comment that “the other prays in untruth to the true God.” The Christian Climacus would submit that the true God is the God of Christianity. In relating to this God, one enters the mode of religiousness B, which is distinct from religiousness A, the deity of immanence that Socrates portrays. In either case, these true Gods seem to be a rank above whatever idols are worshipped, or related to in the other spheres of existence, for instance, the civil servant who faithfully relates to the rational universals of their country or the young aesthete who idolizes pleasure. In the case of the religious sphere of existence, there must be an Absolute one relates towards. This Absolute is more or less uncertain. For Religious B, more than Religious A, that the transcendent Absolute became incarnate, that the eternal became instantiated in time, is so contradictory that reason reaches an impasse. The only way to overcome this tension is by appropriating passion and making a leap of faith.
Hence, the second necessary condition of the objective structure of this religious “mode of relating” is passionate appropriation, which overcomes the uncertainty and paradox of the religious life. Since reason will continuously hesitate given insufficient evidence and objective uncertainty about the Absolute, to relate to the Absolute requires a passionate act of will. It is only by appropriating passion that such risks are overcome. The intensity of the appropriation is eloquently captured when Climacus writes that “if I wish to preserve myself in faith, I must constantly be intent upon holding fast the objective uncertainty, so as to remain out upon the deep, over seventy thousand fathoms of water, still preserving my faith.” The success of such preservation is becoming “pathetic-dialectic” rather than just dialectical. These elements oppose taking Climacus’ claims about truth in a postmodern direction insofar as the structure can be seen as independent of the default state of mind and something to be actualized.
We are now positioned to understand Climacus’ definition of truth: “An objective uncertainty held fast through appropriation with the most passionate inwardness is the [moral] truth, the highest truth for an existing person.” For Climacus, the highest truth is truth about the objective uncertainty that marks all existing subjects, which they deal with by appropriating passion. This highest truth cascades into all lower truths too – knowing-that P hinges on knowing-how to deal with the objective uncertainty of P. And while this subjective truth might be the highest truth for an existing person, this highest truth does not disregard the existence of other objective truths. The superlative “highest,” after all, indicates lower degrees of truth.
Conclusion
To recapitulate my reasons for not reading Climacus’ truth is subjectivity as associated with postmodernity, but rather attempting to preserve the real: (1) it only refers to moral truth, which should be taken as real given Kierkegaard’s corpus inclines towards moral realism; (2) the religious sphere of existence contains an objective structure composed of an Absolute mind-independent entity I can only relate to through passionate appropriation. In actualizing this mode of relating, I access truth about subjectivity, namely its objective uncertainty that is only overcome by appropriating passion. An upshot of this inquiry is clarity on the rationality of fideism. While reason is necessary in coming to faith, reason itself is evidently insufficient since genuine faith requires the will or passionate appropriation.
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